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But it is much easier for the president-elect to talk about restoring American leadership than to do it. The United States is not as strong as it once was. Merely reintegrating into international institutions – the World Health Organization or the Paris climate agreement – will not put America “at the table”. The cost of participating in international negotiations could lie in accepting compromise solutions that would not be appreciated in Washington. It is unclear whether American politicians and voters will be willing to accept such a price.
In Washington, the terms “American-led world order”, “liberal world order” and “rules-based order” often seem to be used interchangeably. A confusion to understand. The postwar world order was conceived essentially by the United States. It is no coincidence that the IMF and the World Bank are based in Washington and the UN in New York. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 only strengthened American hegemony.
Donald Trump came to power in 2016, arguing that international bodies such as the World Trade Organization are no longer relevant to America. The United States has been torn apart and the “globalists” have impoverished ordinary Americans, he said. By eliminating the hyperbole of the trumpet and paranoia, we will find a core of truth behind this rhetoric. In a world where power is more evenly distributed, a rules-based order and a world led by the United States are not the same.
This unresolved tension pervades Biden’s entire approach to international affairs. In his article on foreign affairs, Biden states that “the United States must lead the world” on climate and promises that America “will convene a meeting of the world’s major carbon emitters.” The largest transmitter is China. It seems highly unlikely that Beijing will voluntarily agree to attend a conference convened by the United States – in which Biden promises to “cement enforceable commitments that will reduce emissions.”
Realistically, China and many others will insist that the only appropriate forum for climate negotiations is UN-sponsored meetings. Fortunately for the Biden administration, the next UN climate conference, COP26, will be hosted by a friendly country: the UK. Even so, the president-elect’s promise of applicable commitments to reduce emissions may not be fulfilled, not least in the United States. US negotiating partners will know that Congress will most likely have the final say on any American promise. Since Republicans are likely to continue to control the Senate, the Biden administration will have a hard time keeping its promise.
Similar problems threaten to hinder the president-elect’s engagement in American trade. Biden vowed to resist “a dangerous global slide towards protectionism”. But he knows that Mr. Trump’s hostility to free trade is reaching a delicate deal with many American voters. And the suspicion of new trade agreements goes beyond party boundaries. Hillary Clinton was forced in 2016 by hostility from her own Democratic Party to repudiate the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a broad trade agreement in which she herself participated in the negotiations.
Biden’s solution is to promise that “union leaders and environmentalists” will be “at the table” from the start of any future US trade negotiations. But that could hinder progress towards new trade deals. Meanwhile the world goes on. This weekend, leaders from 15 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan, China and South Korea, signed one of the largest free trade agreements in history. Mr. Biden and his team continue to talk enthusiastically about rallying American friends to fight back against China. But new realities are already materializing on the ground.
Biden’s emphasis on working with allies, as opposed to Trump’s confrontational and offensive stance, is obviously a good idea. But a friendlier American attitude is no guarantee of success, not even in Europe.
The EU is pursuing its plans to regulate and tax US tech giants like Google and Amazon. The Biden administration is likely to oppose many of these initiatives, as will the Trump administration. An early scandal over the regulation or taxation of tech companies could deflate hopes for an impending new era of mutual respect in transatlantic relations – or that “American leadership” is an easy solution to difficult global governance problems.
John Ikenberry, a Princeton scholar who coined the term “liberal international order,” writes in a new book that the idea of liberal internationalism must be separated from American hegemony. He argues that, from the point of view of the United States, “in an era of decline in American power, the value of cooperation with other liberal democracies should increase.” Probably a fact. But it’s a more likely argument to win in Princeton than in Washington, where sovereignty is still tightly guarded.
Mr. Biden will find it difficult to convince Americans that the United States has something to gain from international involvement, but without automatically assuming the role of leader. However, seeing the bright side, America will no longer actively destroy global institutions. Reason enough for enormous relief.
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