[ad_1]
FIRST: Due to his policy towards the EU and NATO, Trump was largely in the tradition of his predecessors Clinton, Bush (father and son) and Obama. But he has expressed more insistently – and sometimes with isolated messages – the need for a fair distribution of burdens between transatlantic partners and the need for greater accountability on the part of Europeans.
Despite odd gestures, such as the partial withdrawal of US troops from Syria and numerous irritating statements to the Alliance, Trump has always maintained his policy towards NATO – only that he would have liked another more appropriate alliance. present, an idea that has stirred the Alliance.
SECOND: Trump’s partisan trade protectionist policy – in which Europeans were not far behind, as Airbus subsidies show – has a long tradition in the United States since the 1980s.
The pressure came most of the time from Congress. So this policy will not change. There are ultra-protectionist measures in the democratic electoral program, such as “buy American” rules and the refusal to transfer foreign productions. Last year, the US trade deficit with the EU was $ 123 billion, half of which went to Germany.
This further strengthens the protectionist atmosphere of the United States towards Europe, as well as the EU’s planned digital tax on US technology concerns.
A transatlantic trade liberalization agreement such as TTIP will not even exist under Biden’s presidency: many of these attempts have failed in the past and not just under Trump. In 2019, German investors reacted to this: last year 37 billion euros entered the United States, representing direct investments and being the highest value since 2001.
THIRD LINE: Like Trump, Biden will fight the Russian-German Nord Stream project. Many Eastern European countries feel threatened in their interests by the presence of the underground gas pipeline between Russia and Germany, and the EU also has serious reservations.
EU Foreign Minister Josep Borrell clarified that from the European point of view Nord Stream 2 is not a joint project, but an enterprise “which is exclusively in German hands”. Americans fear for their liquid gas markets, but not for the security interests of Eastern Europeans.
Biden will not face the sanctions imposed by the United States in December 2019, but he may even resort to a new cross-cutting initiative in Congress to aggravate them.
FOURTH: Under Biden, neither will the hard conduct of Americans towards the dictatorial regime in Beijing, which wants to forcefully expand its economic and implicit political influence around the world, will change.
Washington’s expectations of Europeans to be further away from Beijing will change just as little. Washington will first of all witness with great dissatisfaction the too one-sided concentration of German industry on its business with China. “We should formulate a common strategy towards China,” said EU politician McAllister. This could actually be a very promising vision.
However, the biggest and strongest opponents of a tougher stance towards Beijing are in Germany and France. China will remain a strong point of friction in transatlantic relations. From the American point of view, this is something fundamental: to what extent are Europeans willing to truly engage in building world order outside the EU?
In addition to all the continuing tensions, there will be calm in transatlantic relations: under Biden, the United States will once again be willing to engage in multilateral organizations, such as the WHO.
Biden, who has received large election donations from the environmental movement, will return to the so-called Paris agreement on climate protection and engage in a climate-neutral policy by 2050. The tone used by both sides of the Atlantic will once again become friendlier and professional.
On the other hand, it will not be so easy to realize the great hopes of the Europeans for the idea that Biden will once again respect the nuclear agreements with Iran. Washington unilaterally withdrew from the agreement, while Europeans continue to respect it formally.
This state of affairs will not change in the more or less near future. For his part, Biden will insist on a new “hill” to cloud Iran’s aggressive and brutal policy in the region. US sanctions against Iran will remain in place throughout this period.
From the perspective of European NATO member countries, it is not known how attitudes towards Afghanistan will evolve under Biden. According to an agreement between the United States and the Taliban militia, all NATO troops will have to leave the country by the end of April, if all the political premises and security conditions are correct.
If Biden – unlike Trump – is willing to keep US troops in Afghanistan, the other NATO member states will stand by.
But in this context it will also become clear that the situation will be more dangerous for European soldiers, as the Taliban rely on a NATO withdrawal in spring 2021 and have long since ceased their attacks on Western soldiers. It is also uncertain whether the Americans under Biden will participate as a third country in joint weapons projects in the new EU defense community – Pesco.
Washington was already planning it, at least for commercial reasons, because the resigning US president feared that he would otherwise lose attractive markets for American arms companies. If Biden complies with this, there is the possibility of much greater misunderstanding between the EU and NATO over security and defense policy. (Die Welt-takeover Rador)
.
[ad_2]
Source link
