[ad_1]
Despite huge regional shifts, Eritreans continue to flee through Sudan, helped by resilient and flexible smuggling networks of people.
The smuggling networks of Eritrea-Sudan are flexible and resilient. Credit: SOS Sahel
When the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea reopened in September 2018, it was an important occasion for the two neighbors. For the first time in twenty years, people on both sides were free to get together with their loved ones.
The opening at the border was particularly significant, however, for those in Eritrea. In the last two decades, hundreds of thousands of Eritreans – about 12% of the entire population – have fled from the "hermit kingdom" of Africa. They have defied an official "shoot to kill" policy at closed borders to flee to Sudan or Ethiopia and embark on dangerous journeys – risking predatory militias, exploitation, sexual violence and ruthless tundra – with the goal of achieving Israel, the Gulf or Europe.
The new possibility of traveling freely in Ethiopia – without a passport, permit or promise of return – suddenly offered the opportunity to leave Eritrea with much lower risks. Many have taken. According to the United Nations refugee agency and local authorities in the state of Tigray in Ethiopia, arrivals from Eritrea have skyrocketed. Between 12 September and 2 October, more than 10,000 people entered the camps in Ethiopia.
But while this has been anticipated, the number of people crossing Sudan is, in some way unexpectedly, not reduced. Concrete data are difficult to access with regard to irregular migration, but internal sources suggest that the flows of people entering Sudan have remained relatively large since the opening of the border. The question is why.
How smuggling works in Sudan
Sudan has long been a permissive environment for smuggling. Corruption, insecurity and porous borders have allowed illicit networks to flourish, turning the country into a channel not just for goods and firearms, but for people. A lucrative commercial ecosystem has emerged for the smuggling of people with criminal networks that provide logistics, accommodation and transport to meet demand.
Along the eastern borders of Sudan, smugglers tend to derive from the nomadic communities of Rashaida, Bedouin and Hidarib. They transport the "customers" into vans for a portion of the journey before transferring them to the next group. These segmented shipments allow poorer migrants to adopt a "pay as you go" approach, traveling in stages and working ad hoc to settle their debts and increase the next tranche of funding. This avoids the need for expensive lump sums.
For years, the Sudanese smugglers have marketed these services upstream of the Eritreans through "companies" and local contacts. Leveraging shared kinship ties and tribal affiliations, appease suspicious migrants by defining trips as "low risk" and insisting that refugees receive support from compatriots of the diaspora. Recruiters often attract customers by distorting their expectations with promises of informal social care networks and assistance in finding employment during their travels.
Although this has proved to be an attractive package, these agreements remain exceptionally precarious. In reality, Eritreans face sexual violence and high mortality rates along the way. The insured mediation of local smugglers falls regularly, leaving the migrants vulnerable to extortion and trafficking once trapped in Sudan.
Why not cross Ethiopia?
Given the dangers of transit through Sudan, why have the numbers remained relatively large despite the apparently easier route through Ethiopia?
One possibility is that many Eritreans remain very skeptical of political changes occurring at the highest level. From the peace agreement with Ethiopia, there was very little transparency regarding the pact or information on what it will mean for those in Eritrea.
To begin with, the usual factors that drive Eritreans to flee – including repression, indefinite conscription and economic hardship – are all still in place. There is no incentive for the scheme to reduce the "garrison status" as the national contract work services and systems ensure a flexible society and ensure its survival. At the same time, many Eritreans may be wary of taking the current nominal changes. Having lived under the authoritarian and sometimes capricious government of President Isaias Afwerki for decades, many may wonder how long the border with Ethiopia will actually remain open, while rumors of security measures abound.
The influx of migrants crossing Ethiopia has also put a strain on the reception camps of the state of Tigray, the processing infrastructure and health services. Over-saturation and a host population with insufficient resources has led to a deterioration in the standard of living of refugees, revealing the bleak realities that migrants have already crossed the border.
Resilient smugglers from Sudan
A final factor underlying Sudan's continued appeal to Eritrean refugees is that its smuggling networks remain operational and are likely to suffer in the face of wider regional changes.
Sudan's smuggling link is not made up of signs or cartels but flexible networks of competitive small cells that adhere to the low-cost high-volume "supermarket principle". This decentralized quality makes local service chains extremely versatile, allowing them to adapt to the closure of old routes and to resize them to handle fluctuations in demand. Leaders with political ties can (temporarily) control particular bottlenecks, but in relatively unregulated areas such as eastern Sudan, barriers to market access are low. Here, the smuggling industry includes a series of loose working relationships that dissolve and reform in response to new opportunities.
This configuration helped to isolate the trade from dependence on single strong men. For example, over the past two decades, high-ranking members of the Eritrean Defense Forces such as Brigadier General Tekle Manjus Kiflay would have been included in a number of criminal exploits, including human smuggling. But while the migratory flows were accelerating, these figures are ultimately components of a much broader transnational network. Their recent marginalization reported by Isaias therefore seems to have done little to seriously disturb daily operations on both sides of the border.
The durability of Sudan's networks also derives from their depth. Participating and profiting from smuggling is quite ubiquitous in the Sudanese communities living along migrants' routes, with young men joining the gangs of traffickers to quickly earn money before public holidays such as Ramadan. More generally, these exploitation practices have also become relatively normalized in these communities, especially in the context of Sudan's own economic crisis, aided by the fact that they generate revenue streams and a supply of cheap labor to satiate the shortcomings internal. Because of this significant level of public participation, there is little institutional capacity or inclination in Sudan to suppress trafficking in human beings. As a result, trade has been able to survive and thrive while responding to new challenges.
This resilience of Sudan's smugglers combined with the distrust of Eritreans vis-à-vis the government and Ethiopia's difficulties in managing a large number of arrivals could explain why refugees do not automatically opt to cross the open border to Ethiopia rather than traveling through Sudan. Despite seemingly important regional changes, these factors contributed to the situation where irregular migration flows from Eritrea to Sudan seem to have remained relatively stable.
[ad_2]
Source link
