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Recent attacks raise questions about how secessionist tendencies have been handled in post-independence Africa.
On 25 September 2020, gunmen raided police stations in Mepe and Aveyime, two little-known towns in the Volta region of Ghana. The gunmen are said to have belonged to the Western Togoland Restoration Front.
This is one of two or more separatist groups fighting for the creation of a new nation from the borders of the former British-administered Togoland Trust Territory, which has been part of Ghana since 1956.
The gunmen seized two police vehicles, injured a police officer on duty and fled with a variety of weapons. Before the situation could be brought under control, the attackers had blocked the main roads leading to and from the area. They raised the flags of their new “nation” and asked the Ghanaian security agencies to leave “their territory”.
The Ghanaian authorities managed to contain the events, but the group resurfaced four days later in an attack on a public bus station in Ho, where they set two vehicles on fire.
The emotional nature of these incidents, the history of the group and the ramifications for one of Africa’s most stable countries raise questions about the threat to Ghana and the handling of secessionist tendencies in post-independence Africa.
The African framework for handling such claims and demands for self-determination is anchored in the principles of Article 2 of Resolution 16 (1) of the Cairo Declaration of the Organization for African Unity of 1964. African states have committed to ” respect the existing borders upon the achievement of national independence “, which means that all borders are considered inviolable. Since independence, this is one of the few principles to which all African countries adhere resolutely.
African leaders have condemned all attempts at secession since 1964, including Nigeria’s Biafra, Senegal’s Casamance, Angola’s Caprivi, and northern Mali’s Azawad. They reorganized their position on the issue in Article 4 (b) of the founding law of the African Union (AU). The establishment of the AU border project also shows how seriously African leaders take the issue.
Africa’s firm stance against secession has ensured that state borders remain more or less the same as when they were at the end of colonial rule – with the exception of Sudan and Ethiopia – despite numerous internal challenges to the management of diversity of the continent.
African leaders have condemned all attempts at secession since 1964.
Compared to other regions of the world, Africa has suffered the fewest attempts at secession. In some cases, issues were resolved through international arbitration. However, Africa’s fundamental assumption that “the borders of African states, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality” does not consider that not all territorial borders are clearly delimited. It also glosses over the reality that not all groups have accepted the territories in which they found themselves at independence.
By adopting the principle of inviolability, African groups were left no room to question colonial land allocations or correct errors of demarcation. As a result, pre-independence secessionist aspirations and demands for self-determination were suppressed. It has also made it difficult for AU member states to agree on situations such as Western Sahara and Somaliland.
In the case of the British Togoland crisis in Ghana, the irredentist demands of the Ewe ethnic nationalists predate the country’s independence. Although the United Nations (UN) General Assembly approved the union of the territory with the Gold Coast, successive governments in post-independence Ghana have faced various shades of the same crisis.
The resurgence of the issue in 2020 together with crises such as the Ambazonia conflict in Cameroon show the inability of governments and the AU to manage the problem. They also show that secessionist tendencies, if not properly addressed, cannot be ignored.
Compared to other regions of the world, Africa has suffered the fewest attempts at secession.
The acceptance of self-determination in 2011 in South Sudan, however, suggests that there are established exceptions to the inviolability of colonial borders. He is 16 years oldth at the 2011 summit, the AU stated that South Sudan was an exception and did not “question the sacrosanct principle of respect for borders inherited from the accession of African countries to independence”.
By accepting that there are exceptions, the AU should clarify what the requirements are for such cases. This will provide territories considering a peaceful escape with a framework for engagement. In the absence of such leadership, secessions in Africa have usually been militarized, with disastrous consequences for human security.
The separatist demands suggest that unequal relations between groups and the management of secessions is therefore a matter of governance. The rise of secessionist movements may indicate an underlying legitimacy crisis linked to governance deficits, unequal distribution of resources, and unequal political representation of marginalized groups. Good governance is the antidote rather than the use of the military.
Successive governments in post-independence Ghana have faced various shades of the same crisis.
Ghanaian opposition members highlighted the political nuances of the secessionist flare up ahead of the December 2020 elections. The Ghanaian government has declared its intention to crush the separatist movement. This approach rarely works and offers only a temporary solution. Repression can also cause the crisis to return in a more sophisticated form.
The importance of border issues in Africa – which usually underlie secessionist calls – cannot be underestimated. The AU border project has not received enough attention in the institution’s ongoing reform process. It should be an important part of the reformed structures at the AU Commission.
Although the AU tends to view situations such as the Western Togoland conflict as an internal issue, these crises threaten the stability of the states and their neighbors. Regional authorities and the AU need to keep these issues under control from an early warning perspective.
Written by Andrews Atta-Asamoah, Head, Africa Peace and Security Governance, ISS Addis Ababa. Republished with permission from ISS Africa. The original article can be found here.
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