Apparently nepotism has slowed China’s response to Covid-19

ISLack of testing and further breakdowns have apparently made it difficult for China to react quickly to the corona pandemic a year ago. The difficulties were due to the nepotism and secrecy of the authorities, an investigation by the AP news agency revealed.

As a result, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) granted the rights to distribute test kits exclusively to three companies in Shanghai, with which senior employees had personal ties. The companies had also received exclusive information on the test design.

The AP research is based on interviews with over 40 doctors, officials, health experts and industry experts. In addition, hundreds of internal documents, contracts, messages and e-mails were evaluated.

The test requirements have gotten more complicated

The Shanghai companies – GeneoDx Biotech, Huirui Biotechnology and BioGerm Medical Technology – would pay the CDC for the information and distribution rights. In any case, one million renminbi (126,000 euros) was in circulation. It is not known whether the money went directly to specific individuals.

Meanwhile, the CDC and its parent agency, the National Health Commission and other scientists and organizations have been trying to prevent their own testing for the coronavirus. They brought patient samples under their control and complicated the test requirements for confirming Covid-19 cases.

Due to the inadequate testing system, researchers and authorities were unable to identify the rate of spread at the beginning and at a time when it could have slowed down. Chinese authorities did not report a single new case between January 5 and 17, despite the fact that hundreds of people were infected in the city of Wuhan, where the virus was first discovered.

The alleged lack of new cases meant that the authorities did not impose timely measures, such as warnings to the population or a ban on large crowds. Another consequence was a severe shortage of tests, so that many infected people did not have access to medical treatment.

The test capacity was “very limited”

Due to testing problems and other failures and delays, the virus was able to spread uncontrollably in Wuhan and spread around the world. To date, more than 64 million people have fallen ill around the world and nearly 1.5 million have died.

China was by no means the only country with problems with testing. However, the ailments were particularly severe because the virus first appeared in the People’s Republic. “Since only three companies provided test kits, testing capacity was very limited,” said health expert Yanzhong Huang of the American think tank Council on Foreign Relations. “It was a big problem that led to the rapid increase in cases and deaths.”

The Chinese Foreign Ministry and the Supreme Health Authority did not respond to questions. However, interviews and documents suggest a culture of clubbing in China’s underfunded health system. Although none of the first three diagnostic companies hired to make the test kits were well known in the industry, there were close links between the companies and senior CDC researchers.

BioGerm founder Zhao Baihui was the technical chief of the CDC’s microbiology laboratory in Shanghai. He started BioGerm’s precursor through an intermediary in 2012 when he was still with the CDC, according to emails and financial documents. Through the middleman, he sold test kits worth thousands of dollars to his employer over the next five years.

Relations between authorities and companies

GeneoDx in turn enjoyed special access because it is a subsidiary of the state-owned company SinoPharm, which is managed directly by the Chinese government.

CDC official Tan Wenjie, who was responsible for the development of the test kits, had links to GeneoDx. The third company, Huirui, has also been a long-term partner of Tan.

It is unclear whether the agreements between the CDC and the three diagnostic companies violated Chinese law. Violations of the laws against corruption, abuse of power and conflicts of interest would be possible, says James Zimmerman, a business lawyer from Beijing and former president of the American Chamber of Commerce in China. His colleague Lesli Ligorner, however, explains that the commissioning may have been based on emergency laws and would therefore be legal.

The first step in creating test kits is to obtain samples of the virus and decode its genetic sequence. This leads to testing the design, basically a recipe for testing. In previous virus outbreaks, the CDC has consistently sent test designs and test components to labs across the country a few days after the pathogen was identified. This time, however, the agency denied the genome and test design. Instead, “technology transfer” contracts were signed with the three Shanghai companies, the selection process remained secret.

At the same time, CDC employees on site weren’t allowed to confirm new cases in the first few weeks, but had to send patient samples to some laboratories in Beijing. It wasn’t until mid-January that the complicated and lengthy process was modified and health officials began distributing CDC-approved test kits. The day after the first tests arrived in Wuhan, January 16, the number of cases began to increase.