Africa: Counter-terrorism in Africa must adapt to new realities

As the terrorist threat grows and spreads, could a special unit of the African Standby Force help?

Africa suffered 1168 terrorist attacks from January to August 2020, 18% more than the 982 incidents in the same period in 2019. Years after numerous counter-terrorism operations were deployed, including the African Union (AU) mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and many non-African missions, the continent is no closer to defeating or containing violent extremism.

The threat is also spreading to regions such as the Great Lakes and southern Africa, and to countries such as Mozambique and the coastal states of West Africa that until recently had not suffered such attacks.

Extremist groups are increasingly able to launch and support military offensives. They have developed the ability to finance their operations through illicit international networks and transnational crimes such as piracy and mercenary activities, along with trafficking in people, counterfeit goods, drugs, firearms and natural resources.

In some cases they hold territories that are already experiencing instability. Their work is made easier when states have weak security institutions, poor governance and large ungoverned spaces. Another factor is the return of foreign fighters to these areas after the fall of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

The PSC was unable to agree on whether a counter-terrorism unit under the ASF was the best answer

The growing threat posed by violent extremism across Africa shows the need to revisit existing continental responses. African heads of state at the AU summit in February 2020 ordered the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) to consider forming a special counter-terrorism unit in the African Waiting Force (ASF).

The PSC discussed the proposal on 28 October. Members recognized that violent extremism had become a continental threat that required strengthening Africa’s responses. But the council was unable to agree on whether a counter-terrorism unit under the ASF was the best answer.

A task force has been established that includes all stakeholders, including the PSC Military Personnel Committee, regional mechanisms and AU security cooperation agencies. It will assess the technical, structural, doctrinal and financial implications of the proposed unit and submit proposals to the PSC over the next six months. The AU’s specialized technical committee in defense, security and protection will also contribute.

A counter-terrorism unit under the ASF could help simplify the ad hoc nature of existing missions that some African states believe has made it difficult to develop a structured response to terrorist threats. Under the ASF, the AU’s counter-terrorism operations can be supported by the African Architecture for Peace and Security.

Africa’s response to terrorism could also expand from its current strong military focus to include non-violent preventive measures targeting the underlying conditions that drive radicalization and violence.

An ASF counter-terrorism unit could help streamline the ad hoc nature of existing missions

An amendment to the definition of peace support operations (PSOs) in the PSO doctrine that is currently under review should be approved by the PSC before the AU summit in February 2021. This policy recognizes that multinational and multidimensional operations authorized or approved from the AU, deployed to restore or maintain the peace, amount to PSO. If this definition is approved, African-led counter-terrorism missions will be able to access Peace Fund funding.

However, some PSC members believe that the proposed unit would create redundancy. This is because the ASF, as it stands, should have a multidimensional capacity to respond to violent extremism.

Experts also question the merits of an additional counter-terrorism unit in Africa, demanding that existing mechanisms be held accountable. Others criticize the lack of regional consultations before the proposal was discussed at the SPC, as each regional body has already established counter-terrorism mechanisms. Some states fear that counter-terrorism units composed of contingents outside their regional bloc, and not under their direct control, will be deployed in their “neighborhood”.

Although the AU has developed a general definition of terrorism, what qualifies as a terrorist threat is articulated differently by member states. This will become a major obstacle in deciding whether the ASF should be deployed in response to specific “terrorist” groups.

To reach consensus on the proposed unity under the ASF, the SGP must agree on a United Nations (UN) draft resolution on access to UN-assessed contributions. It must also decide what types of interventions will be supported by the Peace Facility and conclude the African common position on financing.

If the PSC approves an ASF counter-terrorism unit, it will have to negotiate extensively with the UNSC

Annette Leijenaar, head of peace operations and peacebuilding at the Institute for Security Studies, argues that ad hoc agreements are agile ways to address the threat of terror in geographic areas that are in the operational theater of countries involved in missions. ad hoc. They can also receive funding from the European Union and other partners, which is less complicated than obtaining financial support from the UN.

The definition and mandate of the AU for PSOs differ from those of the UN. As the UN Security Council increasingly depends on the AU for deployment in response to terrorism in Africa, the global body continues to insist that UN-mandated PSOs cannot participate in military responses to terrorism .

The UN Security Council and the SGP are also at loggerheads over the mandate of active missions such as AMISOM. Although the AU, under the provisions of Chapter 8 of the UN Charter, has given the mission a political mandate, this is not recognized by the UN Security Council.

Ad hoc counter-terrorism missions in Africa currently focus more on military responses to extremism. However, as experiences around the world show, these interventions alone cannot overcome the threat. Adopting a hybrid definition of PSO would help the AU address this problem. However, it is unclear whether the UN will support the AU’s definition of PSO.

If the PSC approves the proposal to form a counter-terrorism unit under the ASF, it will have to negotiate extensively with the UN Security Council. The significant doctrinal variance regarding the deployment of PSOs for counter-terrorism missions in order to access UN-assessed contributions must be resolved.

Shewit Woldemichael, researcher, Africa Peace and Security Governance, ISS Addis Ababa

This article was first published in the ISS PSC report.