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* This article is published by the Arab Reform Initiative in partnership with Chatham House and is part of a series dealing with the future of governance and security in the Middle East and North Africa and their impact on the role of the state in the region.
In late May 2020, Hesmatullah Falahat Bisha, a former reformist Iranian lawmaker and head of the foreign policy committee, issued a statement to Etemad, the reformist daily, saying that Iran had spent between $ 20 and $ 30 billion on Syria. The publication of such an explicit number on Iranian regional policies was considered unprecedented in a country whose foreign policy is often approached and analyzed – by national and international observers – as independent of domestic or economic considerations.
Indeed, the regional role of Iran in the Middle East and North Africa region is strongly influenced by the development of relations and transformations of the Iranian state and society within state institutions. The growing presence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a regional representative is in part a reflection of the militarization and security of the political system within Iran. On the other hand, the frustration felt by segments of the Iranian people due to the political system’s inability to achieve economic results is increasingly reflected in the criticism and fascination of the role of the regional system. These shifting dynamics have influenced the way the Iranian regime rationalizes and justifies its regional interference, and this can be seen in the shift from a discourse focused on spreading Shiite influence to more realistic formulas focused on security and economic interests.
The growing internal role of the IRGC and its regional manifestations
Iran presents to the Arab world an image of Iranian citizens who are totally loyal to their country. However, even during the periods of economic growth of the 1990s, Yaran continued to witness waves of internal opposition to which the Iranian authorities responded by increasing their militarization. In the early 1990s, the IRGC received a broader platform and increased its participation in the economy, strengthening its position within Iran.
In the wake of the 1999 clashes between Tehran University students and security forces during Muhammad Khatami’s presidency, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard has become more involved in domestic politics and Khatami’s criticisms of how security and l military establishment handled the student protests led to a violent response from General Rahim Safavi. The commander-in-chief of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, who declared that the army will respond by “splitting the feathers of the critics and cutting their throats”.
During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the presence of the military on the Iranian political scene became more prominent. Former Revolutionary Guard officials were appointed to various government positions, most notably in the Ministry of the Interior, and the economic institutions of the Revolutionary Guard were assigned a role in important economic projects. This was interpreted as a kind of compromise by President Ahmadinejad, who was supported by the IRGC during the elections. During the Ahmadinejad era, the military budget doubled from $ 6.8 billion in 2005 to $ 12.58 billion in 2009. Militarization continued even during Rouhani’s tenure, despite his efforts to undermine and marginalize. the Revolutionary Guard. The IRGC still controls much of Iran’s shadow economy. The government defused the 2017 protests by recognizing the legitimacy of some protesters’ complaints, as well as the use of repressive force, denying access to social media and arresting protesters. On November 20, 2019, President Rouhani declared that the regime had achieved “victory” by suppressing the unrest. In 2019, the total budget of the IRGC increased from 202 trillion to 255 trillion riyals, or $ 4.7 billion. The easing of sanctions during Rouhani’s tenure also contributed to investments in the military by increasing their growing influence in the Iranian economy and making more funds available for their activities.
The approach to security: silencing dissent at home and abroad
Another survival strategy pursued by the Iranian regime is the security approach, and it can be defined as viewing or viewing all forms of demonstration as a threat to national security that requires an immediate response using the utmost energy or force. The Iranian regime has been able to address the various expressions of opposition that have taken place in Iran by presenting them as threats. By stigmatizing the protesters with various charges, discrediting them and classifying them as tools of external actors, the regime was able to crush the movements or attempt to counter them, and thus suppress any potential opposition in the future.
Security measures have been taken against all demonstrations that have taken place from 1999 to today. This was most evident in the protests for the 2009 Iranian presidential election (Iranian Green Movement), in which protesters called for the removal of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from his post after declaring his victory in an election that protesters considered a fraud.
The regime greeted the protests with a firm grip and a series of campaigns, arrests and detentions, and the regime’s efforts in approaching security included stuffing unelected government institutions with loyalists instead of qualified people. This pattern prevailed throughout the 1980s and into the mid 1990s. When Muhammad Khatami became president in 1997, he replaced key government figures with technocrats. However, this continued until Ahmadinejad won the presidential seat in 2005 and favored loyalty over qualifications, making this pattern again a common tradition by appointing about half the members of his cabinet and many provincial governors from the ranks of the IRGC.
From exporting the revolution to exporting goods
The Iranian regime’s justification for supporting non-state and state actors in the Arab world has evolved over the years. After the 1979 revolution, the new regime strengthened its de facto internal legitimacy by presenting itself as an expanding Shiite influence in the Arab world and exporting the Islamic revolution. The regime has justified support for groups like Hezbollah on this basis. After Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, the political and religious establishment needed a renewed sense of legitimacy to respond to the new challenges emerging in the country. While the expansion of Shiite influence remained the justification for regional state intervention, the deterioration of domestic economic conditions coupled with the expansion of Iran’s support for various actors in the Arab world required a new logic and rhetoric.
One of the factors was the justification of regional participation from an economic point of view, especially after the tightening of international sanctions starting in 2006. Iraq, Lebanon and Syria have become doors for Iranian exports. As US sanctions continue to put pressure on the volume of Iranian oil exports, Syria appears to be the main beneficiary of its being the largest importer of Iranian crude. The average Iranian imports of crude oil has reached 84,000 barrels a day since May 2019. Iranian exports also account for 25% of Iraqi imports, as the value of Iranian goods represents $ 10 billion of the total $ 40 billion of Iraqi imports per year. . Iran also exported $ 89 million worth of goods to Lebanon in the fiscal year (March 2016-17), up from $ 83 million the previous year. Additionally, Iran traded 44,668 tons of non-oil assets worth $ 79 million with Lebanon during the fiscal year (ending March 20, 2019).
But this economic justification of the regional intervention has not convinced all Iranians, especially since the revenues do not seem to justify the costs. Iran’s economic investment in support of the armed parties in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, at a time when the Iranian economy was battered by sanctions, reinforced the sense of discontent among Iranian citizens, some of whom believed that the money spent abroad was free to spend at home. Since 2009 slogans such as “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, I sacrifice my life only for Iran” Or reflected through the various critical manifestations of the Iranian role. However, the absence of free media and the lack of open discussions in parliament on Iran’s regional role means that public debate on these issues remains limited – which is why Fallah Bisha’s May 2020 announcement on Iran’s spending in Syria it was not uncommon. .
But it is clear that even for those familiar with the regime’s insights, money spent abroad must be financially justified, as evidenced by a statement by Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, military adviser to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, of which he said during a visit to Syria in February. 2018 that Iran will recover the money spent in Syria through long-term economic investments.
Aware of the gap between the diversion of resources to intervention in Syria, Yemen and Iraq on the one hand, and the unmet economic needs of Iranian citizens on the other, the regime is trying to paint its adventures outside Iran. as a necessity to protect Iran’s security and an expression of regional influence. For example, after the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani in Iraq, the Iranian regime presented him as a martyred national hero in an attempt to renew the legitimacy of the regime nationwide. This was particularly evident in the support of Iranian citizens for their country’s regional activity as a battle against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), a battle in which Soleimani played a leading role. Iran used the same structure to fight what it described as “Takfiri jihadism” to justify its interference in Syria and its continued support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq.
Evolution of the system in Iran and relations between the state and society
With ISIS militarily defeated, the Iranian regime’s ideological hold on its citizens in the face of the “existential threat” has diminished, while the economic situation has continued to deteriorate. As a result, militarization and a security approach have become the regime’s primary tools for managing its survival. This development will continue in the relations between the state and society and in the priority of security institutions such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which directly influence Iran’s role in the Arab world.
Due to the growing role of the military in Iranian political fields, which is an increasingly difficult role to control, the Revolutionary Guard is expected to play an increasing role in foreign policy as well, including policies related to the Arab world. Reading the history of Iran since the Islamic revolution and the establishment of the regime, it can be said that whenever Iran faces pressure from the United States and the West, it has sought to activate its regional intervention and its foreign policy, but will Iran be able to preserve this reality in the face of growing disagreement between the state and the local community?
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